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Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Areas of Limited Statehood
Daniel Jacob/Bernd Ladwig/Andreas Oldenbourg
Abstract
The idea of a natural duty of justice expresses our cosmopolitan duty to ensure that everyone’s 
human rights are institutionally protected and promoted. The state system is one way to 
specify this duty: Within a moral division of labor, states have an obligation to protect their 
citizens’ human rights, and the community of states as a whole has subsidiary obligations if 
states fail to do so. In areas of limited statehood, however, both the remains of the state and 
the international community often do not fulfill their obligations. Without relieving them 
of their obligations, this raises the question as to whether it is possible to assign human 
rights obligations to non-state actors operating in areas of limited statehood, such as TNCs 
or NGOs. Our core argument is that these non-state actors do indeed have specific human 
rights obligations, which can be specified by examining their special relations to their social 
environment. Making use of criteria prominent in the global justice debate, we propose to 
distinguish four types of special relations: membership, cooperation, negative impact, and 
power. The relation between a non-state actor and society, then, determines the social scope 
of its human rights obligations.
Zusammenfassung
Die Idee einer natürlichen Gerechtigkeitspflicht erfasst unsere kosmopolitische Verant-
wortung, allen Menschen Zugang zu Institutionen zu sichern, die ihre grundlegenden 
Menschenrechte schützen. Das Staatensystem spezifiziert diese Verantwortung: Im Rahmen 
einer globalen moralischen Arbeitsteilung haben Staaten die Verpflichtung, den Schutz der 
Menschenrechte ihrer Bürger zu gewährleisten. Die internationale Gemeinschaft hat die sub-
sidiäre Verpflichtung zum Menschenrechtsschutz, falls einzelne Staaten ihren Verpflichtungen 
nicht gerecht werden. In Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit funktioniert diese Arbeitsteilung 
jedoch nicht. Ohne die Staaten oder die internationale Gemeinschaft aus ihrer Verantwortung 
zu entlassen, stellt sich die Frage, ob unter diesen Bedingungen nicht-staatlichen Akteuren 
spezifische Menschenrechtsverpflichtungen zukommen. Wir vertreten die These, dass nicht-
staatliche Akteure tatsächlich solche Verpflichtungen haben. Diese ergeben sich aus dem 
Verhältnis zu ihrem sozialen Umfeld. Dabei bedienen wir uns verschiedener Typen sozia-
ler Beziehungen, die prominent in der Debatte um globale Gerechtigkeit diskutiert werden: 
Mitgliedschaft, Kooperation, starke negative Auswirkungen (negative impact) und Macht. Die 
Bestimmung der Beziehung eines nicht-staatlichen Akteurs zu seinem sozialen Umfeld ent-
lang dieser vier Kriterien ermöglicht es dann zu spezifizieren, wem gegenüber der Akteur 
Menschenrechtsverpflichtungen hat.
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1. Introduction1
Governance as defined by the SFB 700 is an institutionalized mode of social coordination “to 
produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide [other] collective goods.”2 
Governance in this sense entails that every governance actor A must have at least an implicit 
awareness of the collective entity C for which it provides some “collective” goods G. In order 
to produce collectively binding rules, for instance, A needs some idea about the C for which it 
produces these rules. Very often, however, the scope of C remains vague.
One way of framing the question “Governance for whom?” is to analyze empirically for whom 
an actor A provides or produces some good G. In this paper, however, we tackle the question 
from the perspective of normative political theory, asking for whom A should provide or produce 
G, where G is highly relevant or even indispensible for the realization of basic human rights. 
In other words, we discuss how to define the scope of the governance collective (Benecke et al. 
2008: 19-22) from the perspective of political morality.
The answer to this first question implies the answer to a second: “Governance by whom?” In 
fact, we hold these answers to be two sides of one coin. Neither the scope of C nor the role of 
A as a governance actor should be taken for granted. Rather, it is necessary to define which 
types of social relations, or which forms of connectedness, generate obligations of a particular 
A towards a particular C, thereby turning A into a governance actor and C into a governance 
collective.
A well-known paradigm can answer both questions at once. According to the concept of the 
modern state, the government is responsible for, and accountable to, all of its citizens.3 “State” 
and “citizen” are complementary concepts. This is true at least in ideal theory and with regard 
to the core responsibilities of any state. To be sure, states bear some responsibility towards 
all people under their jurisdiction, citizens as well as foreigners. Moreover, under non-ideal 
conditions they also have a part in the subsidiary responsibility of the international community 
to secure basic human rights in foreign countries. In principle, however, being a citizen of a state 
S is a sufficient condition for being entitled to some of the goods and services the government 
of S has to provide.
1 This working paper is a slightly revised version of the paper presented at the SFB 700 conference, 
which took place in Berlin from the 26th to the 28th of May 2011. For very helpful feedback we want 
to thank Christopher H. Wellman, who served as our discussant on this occasion, as well as the other 
participants in the panel.
2 In this paper, we use the terms “governance” and “areas of limited statehood” as understood in the 
context of the Research Center (SFB) 700 “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood.” For a compre-
hensive discussion of these terms and the underlying concepts, see Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse 
(2010).
3 It should be noted, though, that the notion of citizenship itself is the subject of a growing philosophi-
cal debate. See Jürgen Habermas (1990), Will Kymlicka (1995), and David Miller (2000).
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In areas of limited statehood, however, things get more complicated. Instead of one central 
actor with clearly specified duties, a myriad of non-state actors operate alongside each other in 
addition to, and at times competing with, the remains of the state. These are, among others, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational companies (TNCs) and organized identity 
groups.4 Even if de jure the state retains ultimate responsibility, it often lacks the capacity to 
fulfill even its most elementary duties, namely to protect and promote basic human rights.
The more specific question addressed in this paper, then, is whether non-state actors operating 
in areas of limited statehood have specific human rights obligations, and if so, how to determine 
the social scope of these obligations. Might it be legitimate for an organized identity group to 
protect exclusively its own members? Is a TNC only responsible for its employees, or also for 
the larger social environment in which it operates? And is it entirely up to humanitarian NGOs 
which services they provide to whom?
In this working paper, we provide the outline of an answer to these questions. Our starting 
point in the following section is the idea of a natural duty of justice. This duty entails that which 
we all owe to each other: the contribution to institutions that protect and promote the human 
rights of everyone. Yet implementing this duty effectively requires specifications. In section 3, 
we therefore suggest four types of social relations which make it possible to assign particular 
obligations to non-state actors in areas of limited statehood, and also to specify towards whom 
they have these obligations. Through reference to such relations, we can specify which particular 
agents ought to become governance actors who are thereby accountable to a particular addressee, 
i.e. the governance collective.
2. A Natural Duty of Justice
We start from the assumption that all human beings everywhere in the world have the same 
moral status and should be granted the same basic human rights. Following Henry Shue (1980), 
and going beyond the suggestions of human rights minimalists such as Michael Ignatieff (2001) 
or John Rawls (2002), we understand these rights to include not only civil rights, but also certain 
basic political and social rights, such as the right to have some say in the public sphere and the 
right to subsistence. According to Shue, these rights are basic in the sense that enjoying them is 
indispensable to the enjoyment of all other rights. If a right is truly basic, abandoning it would 
be literally self-defeating from the point of view of human rights as such.
Notwithstanding potential further requirements of justice, basic human rights form the core 
of the natural duty of justice. Drawing on earlier work by John Rawls (1971: 115), Allen Buchanan 
defines this duty as “the limited moral obligation to contribute to ensuring that all persons have 
4 Many of the more empirically oriented research projects at the SFB 700 focus on these non-state 
governance actors. See, for instance, Marco Schäferhoff et al. (2009), Jana Hönke et al. (2008) Börzel/
Hönke (2011).
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access to just institutions, where this means primarily institutions that protect basic human 
rights” (Buchanan 2004: 86).5 As Buchanan further explains, as a natural duty this demand does 
not depend on any particular kind of interaction, such as prolonged cooperation or an explicit 
promise, but is owed to every human being as such, whose equal moral status must be respected 
by all others (Buchanan 2004: 85).
But why should we stress the importance of institutions? Isn’t the most important question how 
to guarantee that any human being has secure and non-discriminatory access to all basic goods 
necessary to lead a decent life in dignity? If so, the question of whether this requires potentially 
coercive institutions seems to be merely pragmatic. But we can easily see that in the absence of 
institutions, the natural duty of justice would remain hopelessly under-determined: It would be 
left unclear who owes what to whom. What is more, collective-action problems such as possible 
free-riding and an exploitation of the willing could not be tackled – with the consequence that 
the natural duty of justice would turn out to be heavily over-demanding.
Given the need for institutional solutions, the natural duty of justice must be specified in 
the form of arrangements that assign particular obligations to particular actors (Buchanan 
2004: 105). In other words, it calls for a moral division of labor (Shue 1988). The state system 
can be conceived of as the most prominent form of such a moral division of labor. It assigns 
responsibility for the protection and promotion of basic human rights to states and, through 
the assumption that every individual is a citizen of at least one minimally just state, guarantees 
that all individuals have access to minimally just institutions. According to this view, states are 
legitimate insofar as they fulfill their function within this moral division of labor, which at 
the minimum requires that they respect, protect, and fulfill their citizens’ basic human rights 
(Buchanan 2004: ch. 5; Waldron 1993).
The special relation between the state and its citizens, as well as the corresponding obligations, 
thus stem from the rationale that legitimizes the state in the first place. In other words, 
a functioning state that protects and promotes its citizens’ basic human rights is one well-
established way to fulfill the natural duty of justice. In areas of limited statehood, however, 
this division of labor often does not function: In extreme cases, the remains of the state are 
either unwilling or incapable of securing even its citizens’ basic human rights. In principle, 
such situations trigger the subsidiary responsibility of the international community (the state 
system as a whole) and require some form of international assistance to provide for a minimum 
of human rights protection. Unfortunately, however, in many of these cases the international 
community also fails to fulfill its obligations, and we are left, once again, with the universal but 
under-determined natural duty of justice. Confronted with ongoing violations of basic human 
rights, the problem becomes pressing how to determine in a principled manner who is, in 
the words of David Miller, remedially responsible – who has “a special responsibility, either 
individually or along with others, to remedy the position of the deprived or suffering people, 
one that is not equally shared with all agents; and to be liable to sanction (blame, punishment, 
5 See also Jeremy Waldron (1993).
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etc.) if the responsibility is not discharged” (Miller 2007: 98-99).
Given the failure of the state system to specify, or rather to effectively implement human rights 
obligations in such cases, the question arises whether it is possible to assign particular human 
rights obligations to non-state actors operating in areas of limited statehood. Areas of limited 
statehood are neither tabula rasa nor total anarchy. Instead, we can observe various activities by 
formally private actors in addition to, and even in place of, the remains of the state. Some TNCs 
and NGOs, for example, formulate collectively binding rules and provide public goods for the 
areas in which they operate. In order to determine potential human rights obligations of such 
actors, we propose to proceed in four steps:
First, we should be aware of the distinction between respecting, protecting and fulfilling human 
rights claims (see Shue 1980: 51-53).We will take for granted that each and any actor in areas of 
limited statehood has a clear duty to respect human rights, i.e. not to violate them. This is a 
universal demand that, standing alone, does not need further specification (e.g. not to kill or not 
to deprive someone of her property). No TNC, for instance, is allowed to force people to work. 
The remaining questions concern the dimensions of protection and fulfillment. According to 
duties to protect, one might ask whether private actors can ever be entitled to enforce a human 
right, especially if this would include coercive measures. We will leave this open and concentrate 
mainly on the problem of how to fulfill human rights under conditions of limited statehood. To 
fulfill someone’s rights means to help him or her to gain access to the respective basic goods, 
such as basic health care, education, or the means of subsistence.
Second, non-state actors must be capable of fulfilling human rights obligations. Other factors 
aside, it seems that the more capable an actor is, the more responsibility that actor bears. To be 
sure, the capacity to act must be weighed against the moral costs of doing so. But the burdens that 
capable actors have to take should not be unbearable.6 Moreover, as important as the criterion 
of capacity is with regard to agency, it remains undetermined with regard to the recipients. Taken 
by itself, it leaves open to whom a certain relief is owed. 
Third, the human rights obligations of non-state actors in areas of limited statehood can 
take two forms. Non-state actors can be required to contribute to the (re-)construction or 
strengthening of governmental institutions, e.g. by paying taxes, fighting corruption, providing 
capital and knowledge. Essentially, this means “repairing” the state system as a moral division 
of labor, in which states function as the most important means to institutionalize the natural 
duty of justice. Additionally or even alternatively, given the extremely adverse conditions in 
areas of seriously limited statehood, non-state actors can be required to fulfill certain human 
rights themselves. To be sure, there might be a trade-off between these two demands: Directly 
assuming responsibilities that ideally should be those of a government might itself contribute 
to a further weakening of state structures. In extreme cases, it seems necessary to weigh the 
short-term benefits of human rights protection through non-state actors against the medium- 
6 Consider the objections against such purely consequentialist approaches as Singer’s (1972).
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or long-term benefits of a functioning, minimally just state.
Fourth, in order to specify the obligations deriving from the natural duty of justice, we suggest 
focusing on the special relations of non-state actors to their social environment. Different non-
state actors have different relations to the societies they operate in. We argue that these different 
kinds of relations can create human rights obligations which then differ with regard to the 
nature and scope of the collective entity towards which a non-state actor has these obligations.
In the remainder of this paper, we will expand on this last point. In the following section, we 
suggest four criteria to define different kinds of relations which create different obligations. We 
do so by taking a detour. In theories of global justice, so-called institutionalists have discussed 
several forms of social connectedness that might trigger duties of – egalitarian distributive – 
justice (e.g. Beitz 1979; Nagel 2005; Pogge 2008; Rawls 2002). Referring to that discussion, we 
gain four criteria that can be used to determine the kind of morally relevant relations that 
actors have with their social environment: membership, cooperation, impact, and relations of 
power.
In an abstract sense, there is one basic similarity between governance in areas of limited 
statehood and governance in the global realm: In both cases it is under-determined which 
governance actor has which obligations to which recipients. But there is an important difference 
between the original role the four criteria play in debates about global distributive justice 
and the way we use them here. In the global justice debate, institutionalists argue that some 
types of special relations, or some forms of association, are needed to trigger genuine duties 
of distributive justice. The argument is directed against moral cosmopolitans who infer from 
the principle of our equal moral worth that the scope of our duties of distributive justice is 
global. In our paper, we remain agnostic on this point, but presuppose that there is at least one 
natural duty of justice which does not depend upon any kind of prior interaction or association. 
Our question is not what might create duties in the first place; we are only concerned with the 
specification of duties already given.7 We want to distinguish several ways in which remedial 
responsibilities, responsibilities to provide relief regarding basic goods, can be identified and 
ascribed to particular agents (Miller 2007: 100-104). 
3. Four Criteria 
It is important to clarify at the beginning that our four criteria are analytical distinctions. The 
four types of relations may all apply to one empirical case at the same time, yet they might 
create obligations which differ with regard to the scope of the recipients, and which may even 
stand in tension to each other. Moreover, the obligations in question arise only under certain 
conditions. Given a sufficiently functioning moral division of labor centered around the state 
system, entering into relations and adopting roles as differentiated below might not bring with 
7 We thank Christopher H. Wellman for the suggestion to clarify this point.
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it any particular duties of formally private actors to fulfill basic rights. It might even be morally 
forbidden because private actors should not compete with governments in the latter’s domain 
of genuine competence. However, the situation is different if there is a pressing need and no 
official agent available to provide relief.
Membership
Apart from the rather unfamiliar possibility of “membership in the moral community of man-
kind” or in a world state, the membership criterion is the most exclusive one. While the other 
three criteria can in principle be applied to the global population as a whole, membership is 
normally confined to groups, discriminating somehow between members and non-members. 
This, however, raises the question of what (if anything) can justify treating membership as a 
morally relevant criterion for allocating human rights-related obligations.
The first necessary condition is a serious scarcity of resources. Only if one is forced to choose 
between protecting the human rights of a member or a non-member, it might be justified to 
choose the member simply because of her membership. Otherwise the non-discriminating 
natural duty of justice trumps all attempts to privilege co-members. But why might preferential 
treatment of co-members be justified under conditions of serious scarcity? Implicit or explicit 
in many relations of membership seems to be a promise to help each other. We hold that such a 
promise, and the expectations it creates on behalf of the members of the group, then justifies 
preferential treatment. If such a promise can plausibly be assumed, using seriously limited re-
sources primarily to protect the members of one’s own group might be justified.
The potential moral relevance of special relations among members can be illustrated with the 
case of clans. Kathleen Collins describes a clan as “an informal organization comprising a net-
work of individuals linked by kin-based bonds” (Collins 2004: 231). Normally, a clan shares a 
common identity implying norms of reciprocity. It thereby fulfills the criterion of an implicit 
promise. Moreover, it has the capacity to organize the actions of its members. Imagine now two 
families who have lost their homes in a heavy storm. One of them lives in village A, belonging 
to clan p; the other in village B, belonging to clan q. In village C some construction materials 
are available, but only enough to rebuild one house. The people in village C also belong to clan 
p and therefore decide to give the material to the family living in village A.
Although relations between the two clans are friendly, both still have strong separate identities. 
On both sides, these include an implicit agreement to help each other. Thus, the family living in 
village B has to accept the preferential treatment of the family belonging to the clan that owns 
the construction materials. After all, this family would expect the same kind of preferential 
treatment from members of its clan.
By this example we do not want to suggest that human rights obligations towards group mem-
bers are restricted to groups sharing cultural characteristics. Instead, the same rationale of an 
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implicit or explicit promise applies to all types of groups which create justified expectations 
of solidarity among their members. An example for this might be a group of organized human 
rights activists, such as members of Amnesty International working in a foreign country (al-
though we do not want to exclude the possibility of a certain cultural homogeneity among Am-
nesty’s membership). Another example might even be the corporate identity of the members of 
a TNC. In cases of TNCs, however, this first criterion overlaps with a second one, cooperation. 
This second criterion points to further relevant social relations, which reach beyond the formal 
membership in a TNC.
Cooperation
A standard definition of cooperation describes it as a voluntary collaboration of at least two 
parties for the sake of mutual advantage. In areas of limited statehood, however, it seems wise 
to employ a wide interpretation of these two criteria, voluntariness and mutual advantage. First, 
voluntariness should be understood in a rather formal sense. An employee might not have much 
choice but to work for a TNC in order to escape poverty. Still, she must have at least some mor-
ally acceptable alternative. This implies, but goes slightly beyond the demand that a TNC is not 
allowed to force an employee into a work contract. Also, the employee may not be in such an 
extreme situation of one-sided dependency that she has no viable choice but to accept literally any 
offer the TNC might present. Second, the collaboration has to be mutually advantageous only 
under the conditions already given. The conditions of the status quo ante must not themselves 
be just. All that is required is an improvement for all the parties involved in the cooperation rel-
ative to the status quo ante, given that all parties face some set of minimally acceptable options.
Nevertheless, even this rather unambitious understanding of cooperation is not without nor-
mative content. The parties are at least committed to the structural and material preconditions 
of their cooperative relations as such. As already indicated, in order to be even minimally free, 
all the parties must have effective choices at their disposal. Otherwise, they run the risk of be-
coming pure objects of exploitation by other parties. This would also violate the criterion of 
mutual advantage. In that regard, basic rights once again turn out to be crucial. Some rights are 
also basic in the sense that without them one is exposed to exploitative relations vis-à-vis other 
economic actors. Consequently, even if one is treated as a partner in cooperation for the time 
being, other parties can arbitrarily change the nature of the relationship (see Pettit 1997). 
In areas of consolidated statehood, governments effectively bear the ultimate responsibility to 
secure the conditions for all parties to enter truly cooperative relations as they please. In areas 
of seriously limited statehood, however, the state’s capacity to guarantee each party its standing 
as an independent actor capable of entering into mutually advantageous relations is limited 
as well. Under such unfavorable conditions, the responsibility for taking care of the structural 
and material preconditions of cooperative relations might shift to other actors already involved 
in cooperative relations. This provides us with a principle, stemming from the nature of coop-
eration itself, to distribute responsibility for the fulfillment of basic rights among cooperative 
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actors under conditions of limited statehood. Those actors then have a special responsibility 
towards people with whom they stand in cooperative relations, in order to secure that the rela-
tions remain, or can be reconstructed as, truly cooperative. Most obviously, this notion of co-
operation is applicable to profit-seeking actors such as TNCs. But even NGOs often enter into 
relations with other actors that might bring these NGOs into a position that would allow for 
exploitation if the conditions of cooperation are no longer secured.
Take a TNC, which on the one hand has special responsibilities towards its members, the em-
ployees, and on the other hand regularly works with local contractors. Now consider a situa-
tion in which the contractors, though not through any fault of the TNC, are threatened with 
starvation. Neither the state nor the international community is capable or willing to provide 
relief to the starving contractors. If moreover the contractors cannot offer their work to another 
company, their bargaining power shrinks to the point that the TNC can one-sidedly dictate the 
conditions of bargain. In this type of situation the norms implicit in the very concept of coop-
eration give us a reason to allocate responsibility to the TNC for fulfilling basic rights such as 
subsistence as the only way to restore the conditions of true cooperation.
Negative impact
Every cooperative approach is limited in one important respect: Obligations are restricted to 
the actual (or at least potential) cooperators (Buchanan 1990; Nussbaum 2006: 14-22). These, 
however, might not be the only ones affected by cooperation. Every ongoing social interaction 
might have a pervasive impact on others not participating in the interactive process itself. As 
Arash Abizadeh has pointed out, this happens because cooperative schemes of social interaction 
have externalities. The participants are not necessarily co-extensive with the persons affected 
(Abizadeh 2007: 342). Here we adapt an example originally given by Henry Shue (Shue 1980: 40-
46):
Suppose a local peasant owns a relatively large piece of land, providing not only her family with 
sufficient means of subsistence, but also producing a surplus she can sell on the market. Her 
profits make it possible for her to hire six workers, who depend on their salaries because their 
own pieces of land are rather small. Meanwhile, a TNC finds out that there is a very valuable 
resource to be extracted from the successful peasant’s land. It buys the land from her, paying 
her a good price and giving her and her six workers decent jobs in the company. Due to the 
additional money in town and the sharp decline in supply, however, this results in soaring 
crop prices on the local market. The locals who could not find work with the TNC cannot af-
ford to pay these prices. As a consequence, they are left in deprivation. Since they have never 
participated in the cooperative process, they cannot make any claims based on the cooperative 
approach. Nevertheless, they are severely harmed by the cooperative process, even though this 
might not have been intended.
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At this point, the impact criterion seems to yield more plausible results. The TNC, given its 
important causal role in the process just sketched, bears some outcome responsibility for the de-
velopment of prices which, as an unintended result, worsened the situation of the locals. In 
order to make this claim, we do not have to assume that the TNC is also morally responsible 
for the results (on these different dimensions of responsibility, see Miller 2007: ch. 4). We can 
suppose that it acted in accordance with the legal norms in place and without the intention to 
harm anyone. It might not even have violated its duty to consider carefully the consequences 
of its economic decisions. Therefore, we might not be allowed to blame the TNC or to sue it 
in court. Nevertheless, the activities of the TNC changed the situation significantly by produc-
ing negative externalities with a disastrous impact on the human rights of third parties. Other 
things being equal, this justifies ascribing a remedial responsibility (Miller 2007: ch. 4) to the 
TNC regarding rights to subsistence of the parties affected.
Power
While the impact approach relies on the all affected principle, theories focusing on relations 
of power are based on the all subjected principle: All those subjected to relations of power can 
make legitimate claims of justice. In a general sense, relations of power are morally problematic 
insofar as they entail or produce relatively stable or even self-reinforcing social asymmetries. 
Some actors, then, are in a systematically privileged position to achieve a goal against the will 
or the actual interests of other persons (Bachrach/Baratz 1962; Lukes 1974). This wide concept 
of power includes, but goes beyond, hierarchic institutions and capacities to coerce. We hold 
that the moral relevance of power for allocating duties of justice derives from the fact that the 
systematic asymmetries it entails stand in tension to the moral equality of all human beings. 
In the debate on global justice, authors such as Michael Blake and Thomas Nagel focus on state 
authority as the form of power that is hierarchically institutionalized. For them, it is the subjec-
tion under such a centralized state authority which grounds claims to distributive justice (Blake 
2001; Nagel 2005). Notwithstanding everything that might be said for or against this position 
in principle, with regard to areas of limited statehood it is clearly of limited use. In these areas, 
governments often lack the capacity to perform their roles as central authorities which formu-
late and execute rules that are effectively binding for all of their citizens. If the international 
community fails to fulfill its subsidiary responsibility, non-state actors with the capacity to help 
must step in.
As such, the capacity to act does not specify to whom the relief might be owed. However, power 
in the sense of power over is a particular type of capacity. To have power over other people con-
ceptually includes a reference to other, less powerful actors. To be sure, power over is a rather 
vague concept: As Max Weber famously wrote, it is “sociologically amorph” (1922: 28). For our 
purposes, thus, we focus on one specific form of power over, namely the capacity to make col-
lectively binding decisions for an identifiable group. This more restricted form of power is not 
limited to governments, but in principle is applicable to influential non-state actors as well.
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If, under conditions of limited statehood, a non-state actor has this form of power, this actor 
has a moral obligation to make use of its power, and to do so in a legitimate way. If a non-state 
actor has the capacity to make collectively binding decisions, it must use this capacity to secure 
the human rights of those over whom it has power. It must be prepared not only to respect but 
also to fulfill their basic human rights if no other actor with an overriding responsibility to do 
so is identifiable or in place. Only if a non-state actor fulfills these requirements can its exercise 
of power be justified to those subjected to it as a form of power that respects their equal moral 
status. Through this, the power becomes legitimate.
To illustrate this line of argument, consider the case of a rebel group fighting for a just cause. 
This group has a benevolent leader with power over the people living in the territory controlled 
by the rebel group. He does not conceive of himself as a governance actor, but rather directs 
his attention to the cause the rebel group is fighting for. On our account, however, if he has the 
capacity to make collectively binding decisions, he has the moral obligation to use this power 
in a legitimate way. This includes doing the best he can to fulfill the basic human rights of 
those subjected to his power. In this sense, the rebel leader has a moral obligation to become a 
responsive governance actor.8
So far we have spoken of non-state actors which have the capacity to make collectively-binding 
decisions, but do not systematically make use of this capacity. Another case are non-state ac-
tors that exercise power in this sense by making collectively binding decisions, but do so in 
an illegitimate way. For instance, they might not fulfill the human rights of all people towards 
whom they have an obligation to do so, or they might even commit human rights violations 
themselves. Such actors are already governance actors, and as such they must conform to the 
minimal standards for legitimate governance, namely the protection and promotion of human 
rights. 
4. Conclusion
The natural duty of justice is under-determined, especially in areas of limited statehood. Here, 
both the remains of the state and also the international community often fail to fulfill their 
human rights obligations. In this paper, we have argued that under these non-ideal conditions, 
it is possible – and often necessary – to assign specific human rights obligations to non-state 
actors operating in areas of limited statehood. The social scope of these obligations can be 
specified by taking a closer look at the relations between non-state actors and their social envi-
ronment. Adapting and transforming criteria used in the debate about global justice, we have 
identified four kinds of morally relevant relations: Some agents interact under conditions of 
shared membership; some stand in cooperative relations towards each other; some actors’ be-
8 For helpful discussions on this point we want to thank Cord Schmelzle.
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havior has a negative impact on the living conditions of particular others; and some are able to 
dominate others in asymmetrical relations of power.
This preliminary result leads to further questions, which we will mention here as a perspective 
for our future research agenda:
1. Do the four types of special relations indeed cover all relevant relations in areas of 
limited statehood? Or is there a conceptual or also normative hierarchy between them?
2. Does the content of the human rights obligations of non-state actors also vary depend-
ing on the kind of relation a non-state actor has towards the larger society?
3. Can we say more about the potential trade-off between short-term direct aid and long-
term reconstruction of state structures? The question remains of how to weigh the some-
times pressing need to help against the need for institutional improvements in order to 
get down to the root of the problem.
4. Finally, can we say more about ways to hold non-state actors accountable concerning 
their human rights obligations? Insofar as an actor takes part in governance, he must 
also meet standards of good governance, such as providing effective structures of con-
testation and transparency. But how can we enforce such standards under conditions of 
limited statehood, when the problem is exactly that a regular system of enforcement is 
absent in the first place?
We cannot provide answers to these questions here, but the ideas summarized in this working 
paper might provide a fruitful starting point to find such answers.
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Areas of Limited Statehood |  16
Literature
Abizadeh, Arash 2007: Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (not Site) of 
Distributive Justice, in: Philosophy & Public Affairs 35: 4, 318-358.
Bachrach, Peter/Baratz, Morton S. 1962: The Two Faces of Power, in: American Political Science 
Review 56: 4, 947-952.
Beitz, Charles 1979: Political Theory and International Relations. Revised edition with a new af-
terword by the author, Princeton [1999].
Benecke, Gudrun/Branovic, Zeljko/Draude, Anke 2008: Governance und Raum. Theoretisch-konzep-
tionelle Überlegungen zur Verräumlichung von Governance, SFB 700 Working Paper 
Series No. 13, Berlin.
Blake, Michael 2001: Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, in: Philosophy and Pu-
blic Affairs 30: 3, 257-296.
Börzel, Tanja A./Hönke, Jana 2011: From Compliance to Practice. Mining Companies and the Vo-
luntary Principles on Security and Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
SFB Governance Working Paper Series No. 25, Berlin.
Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas 2010: Governance without a state: Can it work?, in: Regulation & 
Governance 4: 2, 113-134.
Buchanan, Allen 1990: Justice as Reciprocity versus Subject-Centered Justice, in: Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 19: 3, 227-252.
Buchanan, Allen 2004: Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination. Moral Foundations for Inter-
national Law, Oxford.
Collins, Kathleen 2004: The Logic of Clan Politics. Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories, 
in: World Politics 56: 2, 231-234.
Habermas, Jürgen 1990: Citizenship and National Identity, in: ibid.: Between Facts and Norms. 
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Cambridge, 491-515.
Hönke, Jana/Kranz, Nicole/Börzel, Tanja/Héritier, Adrienne 2008: Fostering Environmental Regu-
lation? Corporate Social Responsibility in Countries with Weak Regulatory Capacities. 
The Case of South Africa, SFB Governance Working Paper Series No. 9, Berlin.
Ignatieff, Michael 2001: Human Rights as Politics, in: Ignatieff, Michael/Gutmann, Amy (Eds.): 
Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, Princeton, NJ.
Kymlicka, Will 1995: Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford.
Lukes, Steven 1974: Power: A Radical View, Houndmills.
Miller, David 2000: Citizenship and national identity, Cambridge.
Miller, David 2007: National Responsibility and Global Justice, Oxford.
Nagel, Thomas 2005: The Problem of Global Justice, in: Philosophy & Public Affairs 33: 2, 113-147.
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2006: Frontiers of Justice. Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 
Cambridge, MA.
Pettit, Philip 1997: Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford.
Pogge, Thomas 2008: World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Re-
forms. Second Edition, Cambridge.
Rawls, John 1971: A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA.
Rawls, John 2002: The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, MA.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 27 • January 2012  |  17
Schäferhoff, Marco/Campe, Sabine/Kaan, Christopher 2009: Transnational Public-Private Partner-
ships in International Relations: Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks, and 
Results, in: International Studies Review 11: 3, 451-474.
Shue, Henry 1980: Basic Rights. Subsistance, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. 2nd edition, Prin-
ceton, NJ [1996].
Shue, Henry 1988: Mediating Duties, in: Ethics 98: 4, 687-704.
Singer, Peter 1972: Hunger, Affluence and Morality, in: Philosophy & Public Affairs 1: 1, 229-243.
Waldron, Jeremy 1993: Special Ties and Natural Duties, in: Philosophy & Public Affairs 22: 1, 3-30.
Weber, Max 1922: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tübingen [1972].
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Areas of Limited Statehood |  18
Previously published Working Papers from the SFB-Governance Working Paper Series
Schmelzle, Cord 2011: Evaluating Governance. Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood. SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 26, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, November 2011.
Börzel, Tanja A./Hönke, Jana 2011: From Compliance to Practice. Mining Companies and the Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 25, Re-
search Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2011.
Draude, Anke/Neuweiler, Sonja 2010: Governance in der postkolonialen Kritik. Die Herausforderung lokaler Vielfalt jenseits 
der westlichen Welt. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 24, DFG-Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, 
Mai 2010.
 
Börzel, Tanja A. 2010: Governance with/out Government. False Promises or Flawed Premises? SFB-Governance Working 
Paper Series, No. 23, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, March 2010.
Wilke, Boris 2009: Governance und Gewalt. Eine Untersuchung zur Krise des Regierens in Pakistan am Fall Belutschistan, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 22, DFG-Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, November 2009.
Schneckener, Ulrich 2009: Spoilers or Governance Actors? Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 21, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2009.
Mueller Debus, Anna Kristin/Thauer, Christina R./Börzel, Tanja A. 2009: Governing HIV/AIDS in South Africa. The Role of Firms, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 20, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June 2009.
Nagl, Dominik/Stange, Marion 2009: Staatlichkeit und Governance im Zeitalter der europäischen Expansion. Verwaltungs-
strukturen und Herrschaftsinstitutionen in den britischen und französischen Kolonialimperien, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, Nr. 19, DFG-Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, Februar 2009.
Börzel, Tanja A./Pamuk, Yasemin/Stahn, Andreas 2008: The European Union and the Promotion of Good Governance in its 
Near Abroad. One Size Fits All?, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 18, Research Center (SFB) 700, Ber-
lin, December 2008.
Koehler, Jan 2008: Auf der Suche nach Sicherheit. Die internationale Intervention in Nordost-Afghanistan, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, Nr. 17, DFG-Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, November 2008.
Beisheim, Marianne/Fuhr, Harald (Hrsg.) 2008: Governance durch Interaktion nicht-staatlicher und staatlicher Akteure. Ent-
stehungsbedingungen, Effektivität und Legitimität sowie Nachhaltigkeit, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, 
Nr. 16, DFG-Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, August 2008.
These publications can be downloaded from www.sfb-governance.de/publikationen or ordered in printed versions via e-
mail to sfb700@zedat.fu-berlin.de.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 27 • January 2012  |  19
The Authors
Daniel Jacob is a research associate 
at the SFB 700. He works in the re-
search project B9, which deals with 
“Metaproblems of Legitimacy in 
Areas of Limited Statehood.” Within 
this project he focuses on the ques-
tion of how to determine who has 
the legitimacy to govern in areas of 
seriously limited statehood. In his 
PhD project, he discusses under what conditions internation-
al transitional administrations, such as those established in 
Kosovo, Bosnia and East Timor, can be morally justified as a 
means to fulfill the requirements of the natural duty of jus-
tice. 
Contact: daniel.jacob@fu-berlin.de
Bernd Ladwig holds the chair for 
political theory at the Otto-Suhr-
Institut for Political Science, Freie 
Universität Berlin. His research 
focuses on theories of justice, hu-
man rights, moral philosophy and 
applied ethics. Within the SFB 700, 
Bernd Ladwig directs the research 
project B9 on “Metaproblems of 
Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood.”
Contact: ladwig@zedat.fu-berlin.de
Andreas Oldenbourg is a research 
associate at the SFB 700. He 
works in the research project B9, 
which deals with “Metaproblems 
of Legitimacy in Areas of Limited 
Statehood.” Within this project he 
focuses on the question of how 
to determine the boundaries of 
political communities. In his PhD 
project, he discusses contested claims of collective self-deter-
mination and develops criteria for their normative evaluation. 
Contact: andreas.oldenbourg@fu-berlin.de
Governance has become a central theme in social science 
research. The Research Center (SFB) 700 Governance in Areas 
of Limited Statehood investigates governance in areas of li-
mited statehood, i.e. developing countries, failing and failed 
states, as well as, in historical perspective, different types of 
colonies. How and under what conditions can governance 
deliver legitimate authority, security, and welfare, and what 
problems are likely to emerge? Operating since 2006 and 
financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG), the 
Research Center involves the Freie Universität Berlin, the 
University of Potsdam, the European University Institute, 
the Hertie School of Governance, the German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs (SWP), and the Social Sci-
ence Research Center Berlin (WZB). 
Research Framework of the Research Center (SFB) 700 Partner Organizations of the Research Center (SFB) 700
Host University:
Freie Universität Berlin
University of Potsdam
Hertie School of Governance
German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs (SWP)
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)
